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In this paper we investigate the logic and the workings of fiscal rules, with focus on rules 
for subnational governments.  We argue against a simplistic view that sees the writing of 
numerical limits on fiscal variables as the solution to fundamental fiscal problems.  We 
suggest that international organizations should take a more comprehensive approach when 
dealing with the fiscal problems of developing countries.  Such an approach requires a deep 
understanding of the determinants of undesirable fiscal outcomes in each particular case, 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we were supposed to analyze the rationale and preconditions for various 
approaches to designing fiscal rules for subnational levels of government, focusing 
primarily on evaluating the experience of decentralized Latin American economies with 
subnational fiscal rules.  In attempting to fulfill that mandate, we got “stuck” in analyzing 
the rationale for fiscal rules. From our theoretical inquiry and from observing some Latin 
American experiences, we came out with a rather skeptical view on fiscal rules, and an 
inclination to emphasize the importance of taking a broader political approach. 
 
The gist of our argument is that the root of fiscal problems lies in politico-institutional 
factors, such as the incentives for fiscal profligacy at the local level caused by inadequate 
federal tax-sharing schemes, or the incentives for public spending caused by principal-agent 
type problems – for instance, the incentives incumbents face to increase public spending 
during election years.
1 In this context, fiscal rules that do not address these underlying 
issues have a limited capacity to solve fiscal problems, and might even be 
counterproductive. 
 
Following the definition in Kopits and Symansky (1998), a fiscal policy rule is a permanent 
(or long lasting) constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of 
fiscal performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major 
component thereof.  Fiscal rules are thus a special case of policy rules or, more generally, 
of institutions. As a matter of fact, a broader definition of fiscal rules includes both rules in 
the narrower sense above, as well as budget procedures.  For concreteness, in the rest of the 
paper we will use “fiscal rules” to refer to the narrower definition of “numerical limits.” 
 
Kopits and Symansky also identify several key features of fiscal rules.  
 
- Target or ceiling: what objective does the rule have? (e.g.: numeric limit on the 
deficit/GDP ratio) 
- Effective period: until when is the rule applicable? (The authors argue it is 
important for the rule to be effective over a relatively long period.) 
- Statutory instruments: Is the rule written in the Constitution? Is it a law? An 
international treaty? 
- Government level: Does the rule apply for the central government, subnational 
governments, all levels? 
- Penalty for noncompliance: What is the cost of breaking the rule? Is there a 
specified financial or judicial punishment, or is the cost simply reputational? 
 
Fiscal rules are increasingly championed as a key policy instrument in achieving fiscal 
discipline. Kopits (2001) argues that “the primary usefulness of a well-designed and 
appropriately implemented set of permanent fiscal rules, that prevents a deficit bias, 
consists of establishing a depoliticized framework for fiscal policy – much like the 
depolitization of monetary policy under successful inflation targeting.” Thus, fiscal rules 
are construed as an effective policy instrument to overcome the deficit bias caused by a 
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number of political economy considerations – considerations that we discuss in Section 6 
below.  
 
However, it is not immediately clear why enacting or signing a law, pact, constitutional 
amendment or international treaty that states that a certain fiscal variable must respect a 
certain numeric target will affect the behavior of economic and political actors in such a 
way that the rule will be respected. In fact, in Section 2 we review the empirical literature 
on the effectiveness of fiscal rules as instruments to promote fiscal discipline, and find that 
the evidence is inconclusive.  
 
Rules will clearly contribute to fiscal discipline if there is a benevolent and all-powerful 
external enforcer with the ability to sanction deviations; but this is rarely the case. On the 
other hand, absent strong, independent enforcement, it is not obvious that rules can alter 
behavior. For instance, in the case of a central government imposing a subnational fiscal 
rule on local governments, it is possible that the central government has electoral incentives 
not to punish a region that has violated the rule. Furthermore, a weak central government 
might be unable to muster the political power necessary to punish a deviating province. The 
point of the example is that in many federal countries the central government is not 
necessarily benevolent, nor all-powerful. Therefore its capacity to act as enforcer of fiscal 
rules is questionable.  
 
In sections 3 to 8 we explore the theoretical grounds for the usefulness and relevance of 
rules.  In Section 3 we explore the different origins that rules might have (for instance, are 
they imposed unilaterally or multilaterally?).  Identifying the origin of rules is important 
because origin is related to enforceability.  From Section 4 on, we concentrate on the origin 
most relevant for subnational rules in federal countries:
2 compacts among the different 
political units.  
 
We explore under what conditions rules could matter.  We suggest that those conditions are 
1) exogenous enforcement, 2) self-enforcement, 3) signaling to external players.
3  Perfect 
exogenous enforcement is, of course, a very valuable institutional technology, and if such a 
technology is available, almost any problem could be solved at low cost.  We argue that in 
many cases it would be a mistake to consider the central government as the perfect 
exogenous enforcer of subnational fiscal rules.  We focus then on the (more interesting) 
case in which there is the need to rely on some form of self-enforcement.  That requires the 
exploration of some game-theoretic foundations of rules. 
 
The final part of the paper explores the analytical and policy-reform strategy that emerges 




                                                            
2 For the purpose of our argument “federal” means that subnational units are of sufficient fiscal and political 
importance.  This definition is satisfied by all formally federal countries and by some formally “unitary” 
countries. 
3 Due to constraints of time and space, and because this third option is not immediately an impact of fiscal 
rules on fiscal outcomes, in this paper we focus mainly on the first two cases.    4 
 
2. Evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal rules 
 
In this section we review the empirical literature that studies the effect of fiscal rules on 
fiscal policy outcomes, and also present some evidence from Latin American countries that 
have recently implemented fiscal rules both at the national and subnational levels. We find 
that the evidence regarding the effectiveness of fiscal rules as instruments to improve fiscal 
outcomes is, as yet, inconclusive. 
 
Finding convincing empirical evidence on the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal policy 
outcomes is challenging. Changes in fiscal rules are not common at the national level, and 
when they occur, they are often accompanied by other reforms (financial liberalization, 
privatization, etc) that affect fiscal outcomes.   This limits the explanatory potential of 
within-country time-series regressions and of cross-country regressions, because a study 
that finds a correlation between fiscal rules and prudent fiscal outcomes without controlling 
for other reforms would be biased. A related limitation on studies on the effectiveness of 
fiscal rules is given by the question of origin of rules. If these rules reflect voters’ 
preference for fiscal rules, and at the same time, voters desire fiscal austerity, then any 
study finding a correlation between rules and outcomes would be contaminated by omitted 
variable bias. The academic literature on the effectiveness of fiscal rules has attempted to 
deal with these complex identification issues, but the results are as yet inconclusive. 
 
The International Experience 
 
Poterba (1994), Alt and Lowry (1994), and Bohn and Inman (1995) pursue the strategy of 
comparing subnational fiscal rules within a federation such as the United States. According 
to Poterba and Reuben (1999), the argument in favor of this strategy is that states operate in 
a homogeneous legal environment and face similar fiscal shocks; however, they exhibit 
substantial differences in their budget rules, fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes. In fact, 
Poterba (1994) and the other studies mentioned above, document a negative correlation 
between state antideficit laws and the average size of state budget deficits.  
 
However, these studies do not address the potentially crippling issue of causality raised 
above. Budget rules could very well be endogenous. As any law, budget rules are not fixed. 
Rather, legislators and voters can change them. Hence, it is possible that states in which 
voters have a preference for fiscal prudence tend to have low deficits and also pass 
balanced budget laws.
4 In this case, the correlation between fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes 
would simply reflect the fact that both variables are jointly explained by an omitted 
variable. Indeed, Besley and Case (1994) argue that many of the policy differences across 
states and over time that are usually treated as exogenous in empirical work, are in fact 
reflections of underlying voter preferences or economic shocks.
5 
                                                            
4 Peltzman (1992) shows that voters in US states tend to reward fiscal prudence.  
5 To use the words of Poterba and von Hagen (1999), also cited by Schick (2002), “budget rules are not 
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In fact, there is evidence that this issue is critical. Reuben (1996) finds that the relationship 
between state fiscal institutions and state spending depends strongly on whether institutions 
are treated as endogenous or not. Poterba and Reuben (1999) use instrumental variable 
estimation to attempt to solve the endogeneity issue in regressions of debt yields on fiscal 
institutions, but find that their point estimates become insignificant when instrumenting 
with proxies for voter preferences. These studies indicate that the jury is still out on 
whether “good” state fiscal rules cause better fiscal outcomes in the US states. 
 
Regarding cross-country evidence for high-income countries, Kennedy and Robbins (2001) 
survey recent empirical studies, and argue that the evidence is not conclusive. Fiscal 
consolidation has occurred in countries with and without fiscal rules, implying that these 
rules are not a necessary condition for fiscal adjustment. In addition, fiscal rules at the 
national level in industrialized countries have not been in place for long. The authors argue 
that these rules have not yet been seriously tested, because there has not been a major 
recession in these countries since the rules have been in place. 
 
The Latin American Experience 
 
In a groundbreaking study, Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1999) found that an 
index of fiscal institutions that included a component measuring the existence of fiscal rules 
limiting the level of debt was negatively correlated with fiscal deficits in a sample of Latin 
American countries. Higher values of the index indicated the existence of fiscal rules 
limiting the possibility of increasing debt, a more “hierarchical” budget procedure and more 
transparency. Furthermore, the component of the index related to rules in the strict sense 
defined in the introduction was also negatively correlated with fiscal deficits. That study 
suggests that fiscal rules in the strict sense (and well-structured budget procedures and 
transparency clauses), can contribute to fiscal prudence. However, the paper does not deal 
with the endogeneity issues discussed above; so it is plausible that the countries with better 
budget institutions and fiscal outcomes are countries in which voters prefer fiscal prudence, 




Given the difficulties discussed above with performing an adequate econometric study to 
measure the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes, we concentrate in this subsection on 
presenting suggestive evidence from four Latin American examples, Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico. All of these countries have decentralized government spending 
and/or tax collection in the past two decades, and thus are interesting cases in which to 
analyze the effectiveness of subnational fiscal rules. These examples should in no way be 
construed as presenting conclusive evidence, but can be taken as illustrative of the potential 
shortfalls of fiscal rules, especially in developing countries.  
 
The recent move by some Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Mexico towards implementing fiscal rules has received increasing attention from 
economists and policymakers. These episodes look promising as cases of successful 
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implementation of fiscal rules, especially Brazil. However, we show that there have been 
episodes of non-compliance with these rules, and we argue that in other cases it is too early 
to make a complete evaluation of the impact of rules. In addition, we believe that particular 
attention should be given to the institutional reforms taking place together with the 
implementation of rules. In Table 2 we present a summary of recent fiscal rules 
implemented in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico and the level of compliance they 
have achieved. Rules passed in Colombia in 1997, Brazil in 1998 and Argentina in 1999 
have suffered from episodes of non-compliance.
7 For rules passed in Colombia, Mexico 
and Brazil in 2000, we argue that it is still too early to tell whether they have been 
successful. 
 





Faced with a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt payments, the Argentine 
Congress approved a Fiscal Solvency Law in September 1999. This law aimed at achieving 
budget balance at the national level of government by 2003. Apart from establishing 
numeric limits for the central government’s fiscal deficit, it also limited the growth of 
expenditures. Furthermore, the law stipulated the adoption of pluriannual budgeting, the 
creation of a Countercyclical Fiscal Fund, and the implementation of transparency 
measures to increase the availability of information regarding the state of public finances. 
Although the law did not include conditions for subnational governments, it invited the 
provinces to pass similar laws at the subnational level.
8 
 
Regarding the limits on budget deficits, the Law established that fiscal balance had to be 
reached no later than 2003, and it set nominal ceilings for the non-financial public sector 
deficit between 1999 and 2002. The Fiscal Solvency Law was modified by the 2001 
Budgetary Law, which relaxed the deficit ceilings, and extended the date at which budget 
balance should be achieved until 2005.  Table 3 shows the limits imposed by the Fiscal 
Solvency Law and its modification, together with the actual budget outcomes between 1999 
and 2001. Contrary to the optimism expressed by some analysts of the Argentine case,
9 the 







                                                            
7 Another clear case of non-compliance, not analyzed in this paper, is the Peruvian Prudence and 
Transparency Law of 1999. 
8 The exclusion of limits on subnational governments was a fundamental weakness of the rule. In a country 
with a federal fiscal system as the one in Argentina, fiscal rules would only make sense if they encompass all 
relevant governmental levels. Otherwise, they would simply be non-binding. It would be like telling a person 
that they can only spend $500 a month using their left hand.  
9 See, for instance, Kopits, Jimenez and Manoel (2000).   7 
         Table 3: Compliance with the Fiscal Solvency Law 
Limits (as % of GDP) 






1999  1.9%    3.1% 
2000  1.1%    2.5% 
2001  0.5%  2.5%  4.0% 
2002  0.3%  2%   
2003  0%  1.3%   
2004  0%  0.9%   
2005  0%  0%   
   Source: Fiscal Solvency Law and Ministry of Economy 
 
At the subnational level, several governments followed the national example and passed 
fiscal solvency rules. These rules differ across provinces in some of their characteristics, as 
well as in the degree to which they have been adhered to. Table 4 summarizes the main 
characteristics of the existing subnational rules.  
 
<insert Table 4> 
 
These rules include several of the characteristics favored by the recent literature on fiscal 
rules, such as clear limits on government debt and requirements regarding the timely and 
accurate publication of fiscal information. However, compliance with these laws in terms of 
debt and deficit performance has been uneven. Table 5 shows the deficit and expenditure 
targets allowed by law in each province and the actual outcomes for the year 2000. Only 5 
out of 11 provinces that imposed a hard budget constraint actually fulfilled their 
commitment. Out of the five that complied with the law, two of these, Cordoba and 
Tucuman, had been achieving the objective stated in the law for several years, so the law 
appears more like a reflection of pre-existing underlying political agreements. With respect 
to limits on expenditure, three out of eight provinces that imposed limits did not comply 
with them in the year 2000.  
 
<insert Table 5> 
 
The tradition of not respecting rules goes beyond these recent cases.  Several provincial 
constitutions contain limits on public debt. In fact, 16 of 24 provinces have constitutional 
limits regarding the ratio between debt service and total revenue. These limits vary between 
20% and 25% of the total revenue. However, in 2000, only 10 of the 16 provinces complied 
with those limits, with preliminary results for 2001 being much worse. (See Table 6) 
 
<insert Table 6> 
 
Thus, Argentina exhibits both long-standing and recent fiscal rules, many approved 
following international best practices, which have been broken. Several provinces did not 
                                                            
10 Values are estimated, because the Law establishes nominal ceilings for the deficit, not for the deficit as 
percentage of GDP.   8 
comply with their commitments in the face of declining tax revenues, signaling to creditors 
the inability to maintain fiscal discipline and thus contributing to Argentina’s overall fiscal 
crisis.  Inadequate institutional design contributed to the inability of rules to guarantee 
fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, we argue later that institutional reforms, other than rules 




The 1988 Constitution in Brazil mandated a large increase in tax sharing. However, 
Congress rejected a proposal for matching decentralization of expenditure responsibilities. 
Therefore, states were expected to improve their fiscal balance vis a vis the federal 
government.
11 However, expenditure decentralization did increase during the ‘90s, and at 
the same time, the federal government increased tax rates on those taxes it was not 
mandated to share with the states.
12 Therefore, the federal government managed to keep a 
roughly constant level of deficit as a share of GDP, whereas fiscal mismanagement at the 
state level led to excessive state deficits and growing debt. There were several events of 
state debt crises during the ‘90s, in several of which the federal government bailed the 
states out, furthering the incentives for fiscal laxity at the local level. In 1998, a new round 
of rescheduling was accompanied by attempts at hardening state budget constraints. Senate 
approval was imposed as a requirement for all subnational government borrowing 
operations, and the issue of new bonds was prohibited, as was borrowing from state-owned 
banks. However, these rules limiting debt were not fully effective. (See Table 2).  
 
Following the balance of payments crisis in 1998/9, Brazil enacted its highly publicized 
Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000. This law includes rules for government debt, wage bill, 
and other fiscal indicators (as percentages of own revenues) for different levels of 
government. Furthermore, it includes stricter limitations for the final year in office for 
politicians, in an effort to limit the political business cycle. The law contemplates sanctions 
both at the institutional and individual levels. A state that does not comply with the law 
may be subject to limits on new credit operations, transfers and guarantees from the central 
government. At the individual level, a government official can lose her position, lose the 
right to hold a public sector position for 5 years, and even be arrested and fined. The law 
also includes provisions to increase transparency of fiscal information. 
 
Although the law was only sanctioned in May of 2000, there have been some promising 
signs in the past year. Current revenues for municipalities in 2000 reached 6.6% of GDP, 
compared with 5.3% in 1997. Furthermore, 92.3% of municipalities managed to keep their 
personnel expenditures below the target of 60% of current revenue. Only 19% of 
municipalities did not comply with the limit on legislative spending, which compares 
favorably to 38% that did not comply in 1996. At the national level of government, 
personnel expenditures reached 30.5% of current revenues, well below the 37.9% legal 
limit.  
 
                                                            
11 See Dillinger, Perry and Webb (2001). 
12 This constitutes an example of the type of inefficiency induced by inadequate transactional environments 
that we emphasize later in the paper.   9 
These preliminary results are encouraging. However, it is too early to tell whether the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law will have a long-term effect on public finances in Brazil. It has 
not yet been tested by a recession or a change in government at the national level. The next 
few years will require attention on the Brazilian case, so as to fully evaluate the impact of 




Colombia has traditionally been a centralist, unitary state. Departments and municipalities 
have less autonomy than Brazilian states or Argentine provinces. However, political 
decentralization increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mayors started to be directly 
elected in 1986 and governors in 1991.  
 
Consistent with the centralist tradition, subnational borrowing in Colombia in the ‘80s and 
before was uncommon, and required approval by the Ministry of Finance. However, in late 
1980s and 1990s the trend towards political decentralization was accompanied by more 
freedom for domestic borrowing. In particular, there was no effective ex ante control of 
cash advances from banks, and subnational debt with the banking sector rose from 2.6% of 
GDP in 1991 to 4.6% in 1997.
13  
 
As a way to increase control over subnational debt by the central government, the so-called 
Traffic Light Law was passed in 1997. This law brought into effect a rating system for 
territorial governments, based on the ratios of interest to operational savings and of debt to 
current revenues. Highly indebted local governments (red light) were prohibited from 
borrowing, and intermediate cases (yellow light) were required to obtain permission from 
the Ministry of Finance. In this way, the central government would be able to limit the 
growth of subnational debt. 
 
However, the indebtedness law has not been fully effective. According to Echavarria et al 
(2000), some governments with a red light rating have obtained new financing without 
permission of the Ministry of Finance. “Out of 21 departments that required permission for 
new loans in 1997, 10 received new credit without permission from the Ministry […] In 
order to be able to violate the law, departments presented defective financial information, 
and the financial institutions made superficial analysis of it. In addition, the Ministry of 
Finance gave its authorization in cases where it should have denied it.” (Echevarria et al, 
2000, p.9).  Furthermore, as described by Vice-Minister Catalina Crane, while there was the 
expectation that departments would transit from yellow to green, they have transited from 
yellow to red. 
 
The importance of bank lending as a source of financing for subnational governments in 
Colombia makes bank regulation an alternative way to control subnational borrowing. The 
Superintendency of Banks has altered its requirements regarding provisions against 
nonperforming territorial loans. After the bank borrowing expanded in 1993-1994, the 
Superintendency established that any subnational loan with over a year maturity had to be 
considered as risky and consequently should require some provisioning. These regulations 
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were relaxed again in 1996, leading to two years of high borrowing. Starting in 1999, the 
debt of any territory with a red rating in the traffic-light law system must be fully 
provisioned, increasing the cost of those loans for banks. This combination may make the 
traffic-light law more effective. 
 
In a new attempt to implement fiscal rules to stabilize subnational finances, Colombia 
passed Law 617 in the year 2000, the so-called Subnational Fiscal Responsibility Law. The 
main features of this law are:
14 
i) primary current expenditure must be exclusively financed by non earmarked current 
revenues, and should not exceed a fixed percentage, depending on the state or 
municipality category,  
ii) expenditure for state legislatures is limited,  
iii) across the board cuts should be put in place whenever effective non-earmarked 
current revenues are lower than budgeted, and state and municipal central 
administrations are not allowed to make transfers to their public entities, 
iv) there are strict limits to municipality creation. Proven non-viable municipalities 
have to merge. 
v) when subnational governments do not comply with the limits imposed by the Law, 
they have to adopt a fiscal rescue program to regain viability within the next two 
years. 
vi) To promote transparency, there is an extensive list of characteristics and 
requirements for the election of governors, majors, legislators and their relatives. 
 
It is also still too early to tell whether the law brings about a structural change in fiscal 
outcomes, but the provisions seem like a move in the right direction.   Also, the economic 




Following several episodes of subnational bailouts in the aftermath of the 1995 financial 
crisis, Mexico has passed legislation to limit bailouts by the national government. In 2000, 
The Zedillo administration established ex-ante, market based mechanisms in order to 
prevent excessive sub-national borrowing. At the same time, the administration attempted 
to convey a credible signal that it would no longer bail out local government debt. The new 
regulatory framework has four main components: 
 
1. The president relinquished his power over discretionary transfers to states, thus 
limiting the ability of local governments to “game” the federal government into 
bailing them out. 
2. The federal government gave up its role in securing debt with payments from the 
revenue sharing arrangement. This presumably left the states and their creditors to 
assume the legal risks for the collateralization of debt. 
3. Subnational debt was subjected to normal credit exposure ceilings, thus limiting the 
extent of financial-sector damage that one single state can cause and signaling that 
state debt must be evaluated on a basis similar with other debt 
                                                            
14 For further details see Oliva (2001).   11 
4. Bank’s capital risk weighting of loans to subnational governments was linked to the 
international rating of the borrowing government’s creditworthiness. The pricing of 
bank loans thus became a function of the underlying risk of the state government. 
 
To the extent that it is enforceable, we believe that this type of rule (for instance point 1 
above), which changes the strategies available to certain key players, is a crucial part of a 
fiscal reform process. We will expand on this issue later in the paper. For now let us note 
that in the Mexican case, it is also too early to fully evaluate the impact of the reform. 
 
To summarize the results in this section, we found that the empirical evidence in favor of 
the claim that fiscal rules can improve fiscal outcomes is weak and inconclusive. It is hard 
to develop robust empirical studies that measure this, as evidenced by the difficulties 
encountered with the causality problem in the literature on fiscal rules in US states. 
Furthermore, there are cases such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil in which there have 
been episodes of clear non-compliance with fiscal rules, casting doubt on whether they are 
sufficient to change fiscal behavior.  
 
 
3. Where do rules come from? 
 
The predominant view of fiscal rules among economists seems to assume that rules are 
decided by a benevolent social planner (or by some exogenous enforcement agent) so as to 
limit the tendency towards fiscal imprudence existing in many countries. However, an 
important body of economics and political science literature increasingly considers rules 
(and institutions in general), as the outcome of complex intertemporal non-cooperative 
games. Calvert (1995) presents a lucid exposition of this view. He shows that in order to 
explain the effectiveness of institutional constraints on individual behavior it is key to 
explain how institutions can drive individuals to choose cooperative actions that might be 
counter to their individual interest. Furthermore, it is essential to understand how these 
institutions can become self-enforcing – in the sense that mechanisms within the political 
system must be sufficient for rules to be respected. 
 
Before we analyze the logic and implementation of fiscal rules, we will make a distinction 
that refers to the “origin” or constitutive nature of rules. The distinction is important since 
the nature of the underlying problems that are being attacked via rules, as well as the set of 
complementary (or alternative) mechanisms to attack those problems, might be different.  
Furthermore, the enforcement technologies might also differ. 
 
It would be best to illustrate our argument by a partial enumeration of actual (possible 
origins of) fiscal rules: 
 
(a) In a “strongly unitary” nation, the central government imposes a fiscal rule (say, no 
borrowing) on local governments 
(b) Citizens impose rules on policymakers (proposition 13 in California) 
(c) Previous generations (of political actors) impose rules on future generations of political 
actors (for instance in constitutions).   12 
(d) A government (or unified actor) imposes rules upon himself, mostly to signal 
commitment to external actors;
15 for example to financial markets. 
(e) A fiscal pact among “subnational” units fixes certain fiscal rules. An example are the 
Maastricht rules agreed by European countries. There are similar attempts in many 
“strongly federal” countries such as Argentina and Brazil.
16 
 
Some of the rules exemplified above are imposed “unilaterally”, and others are agreed upon 
by contracting parties.  In the first set of rules some actor or actors in a position of some (at 
least temporal) authority try to regulate other actors’ future behavior. This case can be 
analyzed using the now conventional principal-agent literature on optimal contracts. 
However, as we will argue later, this scenario is rarely the relevant one. In federations, the 
central government is composed of many actors, which often are representatives of 
subnational and sectoral interests, and therefore the decisionmaking process of the national 
government is also a non-cooperative game, embedded in the larger game played by 
different levels of government and groups.
17 
 
On the other hand, rules of type (e) are compacts among actors that assume mutual 
compromises:  “I will keep my fiscal house in order, in exchange for you doing the same.”  
It is a situation comparable to private contracts enforced by the Courts; unfortunately, in the 
political (and hence in the fiscal) realm enforcement is more problematic. It is in these sets 
of rules that the non-cooperative game theoretic approach to institutions is most relevant. 
Why do local governors comply with pacts? Who enforces sanctions when a deviation 
occurs? How do economic shocks affect the incentives to cooperate or to subvert 
institutions? These and other related questions should be addressed to fully evaluate the 
effectiveness of a proposed set of fiscal rules.   
 
Even though our general message applies to most of the types of rules listed above, in the 
rest of the paper we will focus mainly on these “horizontal” rules,  since they capture one of 
the dimensions most crucial for fiscal rules for subnational governments. 
 
 
4. Can rules matter? 
 
Rules are supposed to alter behavior, or at least to reinforce and insure the maintenance of 
certain patterns of behavior. In the case of fiscal rules, to show that they have been 
effective, one must prove that in the absence of the rule, fiscal outcomes would have been 
different (in particular, worse.) 
 
                                                            
15 And/or to solve time-consistency problems, the original problem analyzed in this literature. 
16 In these cases, the central government has to be counted, to some extent, just as one more player.  (More on 
this later). 
17 It is also important to be precise about the temporality or intertemporalitiy of rules vis a vis “discretionary” 
action at each point in time.  It is clear that rules (if enforceable) are crucial in example (c), where the 
enacting agents will not be around at later (discretionary) decision points.  In case (a), on the other hand, it is 
not immediately clear why a powerful center needs to define ex ante rules instead of dictating its preferred 
discretionary outcome at each point in time.    13 
In this section we explore under what conditions might rules have an impact on behavior, 
considering the fact that actions of fiscal authorities are the outcome of a non-cooperative 
game.
18  These conditions are either exogenous enforcement or multiplicity of equilibria. 
 
If there is no outside enforcement, and if the underlying game has a unique equilibrium, 
rules will either be: 
 
a) irrelevant (not binding): the actions taken in equilibrium without rules lead to 
equilibrium values of the relevant fiscal variables which are within the bounds 
permitted by the rules 
 
b) ignored: the underlying equilibrium leads to values outside the set permitted by the 
rules, the rules are just ink on paper without power to alter behavior.
19 
 
In the case of games with multiple equilibria, rules might help to coordinate on equilibria 
which, hopefully, are Pareto dominant.  Rules in that case can be seen as a coordination 
device. 
 
An example taken from Przeworski (1997) can help illustrate this point. Take three 
different game theoretic setups representing different structures of conflict, in which A and 
B represent actions by political groups, and 4>3>2>1 represent preferences over policy 
outcomes. The payoff pairs that constitute equilibrium outcomes are shown in bold letters. 
 
Case 1 
  A  B 
A  1,1  2,2 
B  2,2  3,3 
 
Case 2 
  A  B 
A  2,2  4,1 




  A  B 
A  2,2  1,1 
B  1,1  3,3 
 
 
                                                            
18 For brevity in this section we refer to a game across subnational governments; the national actor and 
vertical considerations are included later in the paper. 
19 One would have to explore in more detail why that ink and paper are wasted if everybody knows that 
behavior will not be altered.  This would require reaching into a more detailed micro level of analysis, with 
reference to near-rationality, rules that might be relevant in some states of the world but not in others, 
embezzling, the interactions between the technocrats that write these rules and the politicians who hold real 
power, etc.   14 
Cases 1 and 2 represent the situation of games that have only one equilibrium 
 
In case 1, rules are “not necessary”, because the Pareto optimal outcome is a unique Nash 
equilibrium, and is arrived at by individual rationality. In this case, policymakers may still 




In case 2, exogenously enforced rules would be necessary to implement B,B, which is 
preferred by both but is not an equilibrium in the one-shot game.  Rules would have to act 
so that individual incentives are curtailed. That is, rules must somehow alter the game 
(specifically, the payoffs or feasible strategies) so that what before was not an equilibrium 
now becomes one. This case could be appropriate for analyzing many of the problems 
faced by fiscal policy rules. The typical common pool problem faced by subnational 
jurisdictions due to credit market externalities is a case in which cooperation is not a Nash 
equilibrium. If everybody else is running a low level of debt, then an individual province 
has the incentive to defect and run a high level of debt at a low cost. The key lesson from 
this example is that for fiscal rules to matter, they must be enforceable, meaning that they 
somehow affect the fiscal game so as to curtail individual incentives to defect from the 
desired policy. 
 
Hence, a key issue in determining whether fiscal rules can be an effective mechanism to 
achieve fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability is the extent to which these rules can 
                                                            
20 The rule might have value as a signalling device to external creditors, for instance, but it is redundant in the 
sense that it does not alter behavior related to fiscal outcomes.  
The value of rules as signalling devices regarding the outcome of complex games that are costly to monitor 
for outsiders is an interesting topic of research which we do not fully develop in this paper. However, if the 
signalling device helps to use financial markets as an external enforcer of the rule, then one could argue that 
the rule is valuable not only as a signalling device, but rather as a way to improve fiscal outcomes, even in 
cases in which the political equilibrium absent the rule leads to inefficient outcomes. This reasoning, 
developed below, could provide theoretical underpinnings to research such as Ter-Minassian and Craig 
(1997), who study the different ways – including rules-based approaches – that countries attempt to solve the 
problem of credit market externalities in subnational debt.  
Credit market externalities among members of a federation (provinces or countries) arise directly when the 
central government (or arrangements between the members) implicitly guarantees to pay in case of default. 
However, these externalities can also arise even without the existence of bailout guarantees. Calvo and 
Mendoza (1996), for instance, argue that under fixed costs of information collection and processing, together 
with an increasing number of diversification opportunities, it is optimal for investors not to invest in acquiring 
the necessary information to distinguish clearly between different countries in a same region or class (eg: 
emerging markets). This leads to contagion across states, and thus to credit market externalities. If one 
country in a federation is perceived as having a high default risk, this perception will increase the cost of 
borrowing for other members. 
In the presence of credit market externalities (or other politico-economic incentives to excessive spending and 
borrowing, for that matter), a case for fiscal rules can be made, arguing that they can act as a signaling device 
for the financial market to act as enforcer of fiscal commitments. This in fact is a way for a country to 
increase the cost of fiscal laxity. Following the logic of Calvo and Mendoza (1996), if gathering information 
on countries is expensive, and creditors’ optimal strategy is to underinvest in information collection, then 
providing a simple fiscal rule that reduces the cost of collecting and processing information on a country can 
increase the attention that financial markets pay to fiscal accounts in that country. This in turn will make it 
costly to break the rule, and will thus contribute to fiscal discipline. Furthermore, in a federal country, the 
central government can increase the cost of fiscal misbehavior for subnational governments, by announcing a 
fiscal rule for these governments, and publishing information on the compliance of the rule.    15 
be enforced. In the relevant case in which rules attempt to change individual behavior 
towards cooperation, it is unlikely they will work unless they include effective mechanisms 
to affect the incentives of the relevant actors to comply with the rule. For instance, if a 
federal fiscal agreement stipulates that all subnational governments will reduce their 
nominal spending by 5% and leaves enforcement to the courts, the result is ambiguous. In a 
country in which the courts lack political independence, their decision can be subverted, 
and thus the rule is unlikely to affect the incentives to adjust faced by local policymakers. 
The examples from Latin America presented in Section 2 are cases in which agreements of 
this type have been violated.  
 
Absent a perfect external enforcer, institutions – and fiscal rules in particular – must 
become “self-enforceable” -- Calvert (1995). This means that enforcement must come from 
“within the game”, that is, from changes in payoffs, feasible strategies or other fundamental 
conditions that affect individual behavior.    One case in which rules can have an impact is 
when there are multiplicity of equilibria, as in case 3.  In that case, rules can act as a 
coordinating device, so that the groups can select the B,B equilibrium that is preferred by 
both.  
 
The arguments presented so far support the view that fiscal rules could be redundant in 
some cases,
21 and might not be sufficient to alter irresponsible fiscal behavior in others, if 
not accompanied by deeper institutional changes that substantially affect the fiscal game. In 
Section 2 we have shown evidence from Latin American countries that is consistent with 
the second claim. 
 
So far in this section, we have described the game among fiscal authorities as a static game.  
Of course, the game-theoretic language and style of analysis can take us closer to the reality 
of dynamic fiscal games. On the one hand, fiscal games are not stationary, since many 
relevant underlying variables do change exogenously (and even endogenously).  The 
international prices of the main staple exported (and taxed) in certain regions of the country 
might change, or the dynamics of inflation or of debt accumulation might put the country so 
close to the brink that the payoffs of cooperation are increased substantially.
22  In those 
transitions, fiscal rules can also play the role of coordinating device towards the new, more-
cooperative equilibrium, coordinating the level at which fiscal variables will be stabilized. 
Indeed, we believe that this is very relevant in practice, and relates to the discussion on the 
endogeneity problems in assessing the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes.  
Furthermore, it stresses the point that things other than just the rules should be happening 
for fiscal consolidation. 
 
Additionally, even if we abstract from non-stationarities, games among subnational (and 
national) governments are repeated games, in which fiscal decisions are taken time after 
time. In the context of repeated games, we are much more likely to fall under case 3, as the 
normal form of a much larger game, which might consist of the repetition of the game in 
                                                            
21 Kopits (2001) describes US fiscal and monetary discipline in recent years as an example of successful 
discretionary policymaking. This could be viewed as corresponding with the game in case 1 above. 
22 This latter case has been analyzed in Velasco (1999) and Mondino, Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1996).  See 
also Aizenman (1998) and Tornell (1995).   16 
case 2.  In that sense, we concur with Drazen (2002) that rules and reputation should be 
seen as complements:  rules (or institutions more generally) might help to coordinate 
actions towards cooperative play, given the multiplicity of equilibria in repeated games. 
 
In the rest of the analysis we will focus on that situation. In that case one has to look into all 
the factors that affect the likelihood of achieving a cooperative equilibrium, and we have to 
look at the role that fiscal rules (narrowly defined) can play in that broader context. 
 
 
5. Institutions, cooperation and fiscal outcomes 
 
In many countries (certainly including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) federal 
fiscal interactions are an important part of the broader political game in which most 
relevant economic and social policy decisions are taken.
23 At the same time, decisions 
taken in the fiscal realm are the outcome of a sub-game which is affected by the set of 
institutions (rules in the broader sense) affecting the overall political game. 
 
For those reasons, in order to improve fiscal and macroeconomic performance, as well as to 
attain broader goals (including adequate provision of social insurance, development of 
human capital, and social integration), it is important to have a broader understanding of the 
determinants of poor performance, and to attempt solutions that tackle the core reasons 
behind non-cooperative behavior by different levels of government. 
 
This is easier said than done. Among other things, it does require deeper (political!) 
country-specific analysis than the one that tends to support standardized recommendations 
from international organizations and other wholesalers of economic advice. 
 
In the rest of the paper we attempt a generic sketch of the nature of underlying problems of 
decentralized federal countries.  We illustrate the approach with one country (Argentina) to 
expose the difficulties of achieving an adequate diagnostic, and the nature of the type of 
solution required, in which fiscal rules (narrowly defined) are only one component of a 
broader strategy of institutional reform. 
 
 
6. Deficient outcomes and the actions that generate them 
 
The problems underlying poor macroeconomic and fiscal behavior could be summarized in 
two categories: principal-agent problems and cooperation problems.  By principal-agent we 
refer to the relation between the citizens and their elected representatives. Imprudent fiscal 
behavior is often the result of actions taken by public officers who are not maximizing the 
welfare of their constituencies.  By cooperation problems we refer to the game played by 
multiple subnational and national political actors that maximize objectives that, to some 
extent, include the welfare of their electors.  Both problems are at work in actual 
                                                            
23 In the case of Argentina, for instance, it would be impossible to analyze the performance of social sector 
policies without reference at the federal fiscal (and political) game.  See for instance Fiszbein and Tommasi 
(2001).   17 
federations.  For brevity, we concentrate here on the second, “intergovernmental” problem, 




Table 1 presents a very succinct summary of a number of fiscal policy problems identified 
in the political economy literature over the last couple of decades.
25 The problems are 
classified between those faced by any country (or smaller political unit) even if “unitary”, 
and those additional problems faced by a federation of states or of countries. 
 
Table 1: Fiscal Policy Problems and their Consequences 
Underlying problem  Size of public spending  Deficit / debt 
accumulation 
Inefficient allocation 




Too high  Excessive debt 
accumulation 
Underinvestment in 




cycle, strategic use of 
debt) 
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Too high  Too high  Corruption, inefficiency 
Federation       
Common pool across 
jurisdictions (dispute 
over federal transfers, 
local public spending, 
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Too high (static)  Too high (dynamic) 
Credit market 
externalities 
Too high  Too high 
Bailouts  Too high  Too high 
Structure of federal 
transfers (low 
incentives to tax, etc) 









































   
 
Any country that considers the imposition of subnational fiscal rules is faced with 
challenging problems.  These problems include suboptimal macro-fiscal outcomes, such as 
excessive subnational deficits, excessive indebtedness, insufficient local taxation; as well as 
other (more micro) distortions, such as distortionary national taxation, inefficient 
                                                            
24 As a first approximation we are treating the two problems as orthogonal, although we will refer to some 
interactions occassionally. 
25 For a classic survey, see Alesina and Perotti (1995), as well as Drazen (2002).   18 
subnational taxation, procyclical fiscal behavior, rigidities in national tax policies, 
inadequate risk-sharing, etc. 
 
Many of these inefficient outcomes can be understood as the result of non-cooperative 
actions taken by subnational and national authorities. A typical, but by no means unique 
example of subnational governments not taking into account the full effects that their fiscal 
actions have on the welfare of the whole country, are the cases in which they take a lax 
fiscal stance (for instance, not adjusting when hit by permanent shocks), in the expectation 
that they will be bailed out in the case of a fiscal crisis.
26   This opportunistic behavior by 
subnational governments is often corresponded by opportunism on the part of the federal 
government, whose generosity at bailout time depends on the political alignment of the 
subnational government in question, or on the exchange of bailouts for favorable votes on 
salient national issues at the time. 
 
Another example of non-cooperative behavior -- described in Dillinger, Perry and Webb 
(2001), with reference to Brazil and Argentina – affects the quality of the tax system.  Since 
tax-sharing agreements in many countries require federal and state governments to share 
the most efficient taxes, these agreements create a systemic incentive to increase inefficient 
taxes.  For that reason, both Brazil and Argentina ended up with excessive social security 
taxes, and other inefficient taxes on transactions such as taxes on checks.
27   
 
These examples reflect the transactional problems underlying intergovernmental relations.  
If there were no transaction costs in these intergovernmental dealings, more efficient policy 
adjustments could be achieved, via adequate intergovernmental compensations.  As some 
readers might have noticed, this is precisely the style of reasoning of transaction cost 
economics, applied here to political transactions.
28  This approach is also useful to 
understand many of the rigidities built into federal fiscal arrangements, precisely to protect 
from the type of opportunistic actions described above.  Very salient examples are the 
revenue guarantees given by the federal government of Argentina to the provinces in the 
1999 and 2000 fiscal pacts. This guarantee led to very costly negotiations during the 2001 
crisis, contributing to put at risk the overall sustainability of the national macroeconomic 
                                                            
26 This is, of course, a very common occurrence throughout Latin America.  See Kopits et al (2000) for 
Argentina and Brazil, Nicolini et al (2000) for Argentina, Dillinger (1997) and Bevilaqua (2000) for Brazil, 
Hernández Trillo et al (2000) for Mexico, Echavarría et al (2000) for Colombia, Gamboa (1997) for a 
comparison of the U.S., Brazil and Mexico.  Additionally, Fernández-Arias et al (2000) report bailouts in 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Uruguay. 
27 The list of examples of inefficiencies induced by non-cooperation in federal fiscal games is quite long, 
including procyclical subnational fiscal behavior, excessive public employment, inability to reform an 
inefficient tax system, and underinvestment in the capacity to raise taxes efficiently  – see for instance 
Sanguinetti et al (2001) and Saiegh and Tommasi (2000).  Haggard and Webb (2001) provide an interesting 
example of induced distortions (gaps and inequities) in the provision of social services in Brazil:  “Having 
failed to decentralize federal functions formally, the federal government had to cut its own spending, 
especially in the stabilization of 1994, and started devolving the responsibility for certain expenditures via ad 
hoc agreements with individual subnational governments.  (...) The federal government also managed to shift 
some health care costs onto subnational governments by reducing the amount of federal compensation 
payments.” (Haggard and Webb, 2001, p. 23). 
28 This way of reasoning has been dubbed transaction cost politics by North (1990) and Dixit (1996).  A 
survey is provided in Arias and Caballero (2001).   19 
stance, which eventually collapsed in December of 2001.  (See also González, Rosenblath 
and Webb, 2002). 
 
Notice that these rigidities share some similarities with rules narrowly defined.  Such 
rigidities can be understood on the basis of a framework developed in Sanguinetti et al 
(2001).  One of the main results of that framework can be summarized with the following 
figure. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 > 
 
The figure indicates that when the determinants of cooperation (the discount factor in the 
explicit model) are such that intertemporal cooperation is possible, optimal policies will 
obtain. These policies will not be subject to the opportunistic behavior of the different 
players. Instead, they will be flexible enough to accommodate changing economic 
circumstances.  If, on the other hand, the determinants of cooperation are such that 
intertemporal cooperation is not feasible, then two things might happen.  Either outcomes 
will be subject to the opportunism of those players with the capacity to move at any 
particular node, or the players will impose rigid rules to prevent opportunistic behavior.  
Either of these regimes delivers lower welfare than the one obtained in the northern region 
of the diagram.  This is an important point to bear in mind, since later we will argue that the 
“rules” approach implies moving east-ward in the diagram, while our approach calls for 




7. The determinants of cooperation 
 
All these suboptimal actions are the reflection of non-cooperative behavior by subnational 
and national authorities.  The deeper question, then, is what determines the degree of 
cooperation in intergovernmental relations. In figure 1, such elements are summarized in a 
discount factor.  More generally, whether cooperation obtains, depends on the factors that 
affect the payoffs in the stage game (the game at each point in time), and on the factors that 
affect the intertemporal properties of the game.
30 The set of determinants of cooperation 
includes both variables pertaining to the fiscal system, as well as variables pertaining to the 
political system broadly defined.  (The partition is arbitrary, since there are features - such 
as the nature of intergovernmental institutions - that are both fiscal and political). 
 
Before referring to fiscal and political variables specifically, let us reproduce a more 
abstract listing of variables affecting the likelihood of cooperation in these types of games 
(from Spiller and Tommasi, 2001): 
 
Payoffs of the stage game: mostly related to characteristics of the fiscal system (see below). 
                                                            
29 Furthermore, the model that leads to figure 1 assumes the availability of an enforcement technology for 
rigid rules.  If such a technology is not available, even enforcing rules would require some form of 
cooperation, along the lines developed in the rest of the text. 
30 More properly, if we look at the overall intertemporal game expressed in normal form, the possibility of 
cooperation depends on the elements of the description of the game (payoffs of the stage game, timing of 
moves, information structure, etc.)   20 
 
Number of political actors with power over a given decision: the larger the number of 
players, the smaller the set of other parameters for which cooperation obtains. 
 
Length of the horizons / patience of key political actors: the likelihood of cooperation 
increases with patience. 
 
Intertemporal linkages among key political actors: the intertemporal pattern of interactions 
among specific individuals in formal political positions (legislators, governors, bureaucrats) 
matters for developing cooperative outcomes. 
 
Characteristics of the arenas where key political actors undertake their exchanges: the 
complex intertemporal exchanges required for the implementation of effective public 
policies could be facilitated by the existence of institutionalized exchange arenas.
31 
 
Timing and observability of moves: cooperation is harder to sustain if there is plenty of 
room for unilateral moves which are hard to observe or hard to verify.  This relates to an 
important point about transparency emphasized in the literature on fiscal rules,
32 and more 
specifically to bailout channels available.  In our application to the Argentine case we will  
refer to the national executive’s discretion in the geographical allocation of national 
spending. 
 
Availability of enforcement technologies: needless to say, the availability of enforcement 
technologies facilitates cooperation.  Such technologies might include the Courts, a 
professional and independent bureaucracy, or the role of international organizations. The 
potential role of international organizations as enforcers of domestic agreements is an issue 
that requires more detailed analysis than the brief mention that we provide here.  Latin 
American countries would benefit from having someone play the role that the European 





Coming back to fiscal and political (as opposed to abstract theoretic) variables, key 
variables of the fiscal system that will affect the likelihood of cooperation, mostly through 
their effect on stage-payoffs, include:
34 
- the allocation of tax and spending responsibilities among governments 
                                                            
31 The landmark in the literature is the depiction of the U.S. Congress by Weingast and Marshall (1988).   
32 See for instance Kopits and Craig (1998). 
33 It is worth noting that in the European case, the “exogenous enforcement”  provided by the community 
strengthens the hand of those domestic actors more interested in fiscal conservatism.  It turns out that, 
depending on the nature of federal arrangements, there are cases in which all “internal” actors are in favor of 
fiscal largesse.  The latter is indeed the case in many Latin America federations -- see Jones, Sanguinetti and 
Tommasi (2000) for evidence on that regard.  
34 It is easy to see that, in this dynamic system, several of these features of the fiscal system are outcomes of 
previous stages of the game (of history).  Nonetheless, they are given at any point in time, affecting the 
likelihood of cooperation from that moment into the future.  These fiscal variables play a similar role than the 
one played by market variables such as price elasticities, observability of contracts, and the like in dynamic 
oligopoly games – see for instance Green and Porter (1984).   21 
- underlying heterogeneities in tax capacities and in fiscal needs of subnational 
units 
- the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance 
- the features of the intergovernmental transfer system. 
 
The vertical structure of the fiscal system is a crucial determinant affecting the payoffs 
from cooperation.
35  As Eichengreen and von Hagen have emphasized in a series of papers 
(1996, 2000), non-cooperative subnational fiscal behavior is more likely, the larger the 
vertical fiscal imbalance (the smaller the capacity of the subnational government to react by 
its own means in case of fiscal stress.)
36 
 
Key political variables are those that impinge upon the qualities of the arenas of 
intergovernmental decision making in fostering cooperation.  Roughly speaking there are 
two (interrelated) arenas: one is intergovernmental relations per se (such as the Premier’s 
Conference in Australia) the other is the very structure of the federal government.  We 
stress the latter in the next section, in which we also explore more generally the types of 
political variables that correspond to the abstract listing above. 
 
 
8. The central government is not a unified benevolent planner 
 
Many discussions of fiscal rules for subnational governments take the implicit view that the 
central government is a unified and benevolent actor, whose only flaws might arise from 
time-consistency problems.
37   We believe that such a view is an incorrect one.  A 
benevolent and unified central government (vis a vis the intergovernmental fiscal game) 
cannot be assumed as the general case, but only as a particular case which might be 
(approximately) true under some conditions. 
 
More generally, the central government is a political arena with particular selection rules in 
which the representation of subnational interests interacts with some “purely national” 
interests.  The purely national interests, in turn, include: 
- on the positive side:  the more encompassing national interest due to the broader 
electoral base of the president;
38 and  
- on the possibly negative side: the “spurious” national political interests – national 
officials want to be given the credit for things such as distributing welfare 
                                                            
35 For brevity in the text we refer to “cooperation” and “lack thereof” as dichotomous alternatives, even 
though actual fiscal games tend to be more continous. 
36 See also Rodden (1999).  Rodden and Wibbels (2001) provide a number of additional fiscal/political 
linkages between federalism and macroeconomic management.  Some of their hypotheses include:  “a 
federation’s capacity to control deficits and inflation decreases with the share of total provincial expenditure 
carried out by the largest province,” and  “a federation’s capacity to control deficits and inflation decreases as 
the number of states increases.” 
37 That view is more vivid in reference to the so-called “administrative controls” of subnational indebtness 
(see for instance Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997). 
38 For brevity and concreteness we focus the wording on presidential systems, the most prevalent case in Latin 
America, although the logic is also valid, with proper adjustment, for parliamentary systems.   22 




The exact incentives of subnational and “purely national” actors, as well as the exact rules 
of the game they play, will depend on the details of political institutions.  These include: 
- electoral mechanisms for different offices 
- legislative structure (number of chambers, etc.) 
- legislative decision-making rules (including the legislative prerogatives of the 
executive; Carey and Shugart, 1998). 
- the role of Courts
40 
- the underlying distribution of economic, social and ethnic cleavages, as well as 
their mapping to political geography. 
 
At one extreme, one can find cases where the central government is totally free from “the 
infiltration of subnational interests.”
41   More generally, one needs to identify the 
configuration of “national” political institutions that are more or less prone to fall into the 
politically motivated bailouts that distort incentives in decentralized fiscal structures. 
 
As stated in the previous section, one needs to look also into the arenas other than the 
internal structure of the federal government through which intergovernmental relations take 
place, and to the interaction between these two spheres.  Hoping that by now the reader will 
recognize the importance of “political detail” to explain fiscal outcomes in federal contexts, 






9. The evolution of institutions, politics and fiscal outcomes in the Argentine case 
 
Argentina is a country in which provinces have strong constitutional rights.  Expenditure is 
fairly decentralized and tax collection fairly centralized, leading to almost 65% of 
provincial spending financed out of a common pool of taxes.  There is wide variation 
around that average, with 10 out of 23 provinces financing less than 20% of their spending 
with own revenues.  The main channel to adjust to this vertical fiscal imbalance is the 
Federal Tax-Sharing agreement, a convoluted method that is bargained over and over and is 
at the heart of Argentina’s problems. Sanguinetti et al (2001) provide more details, and also 
                                                            
39 This is one of the points in which we depart from the assumption of orthogonality between problems of 
intergovernmental cooperation  and principal-agent problems between citizens and politicians. 
40 Related to the main issue of this paper, Bohn and Inman (1996), find that balance-budget rules in the US 
states are more effective when they are enforced by directly-elected (as opposed to government-appointed) 
supreme courts. 
41 We thought that, among federations / decentralized unions, China would constitute an example of 
“independence” of the central government.  Yet, we came across the following statement by Shah (1998, p. 
87): “regional communist party bosses-governors exercise a moderating influence on an otherwise monolithic 
state council at the federal level.”   23 
summarize a number of deficiencies of fiscal federalism in Argentina which have been 
identified in the literature: 
 
- high deficits of sub-national governments 
- increasing indebtedness of sub-national governments 
- procyclical finances of sub-national governments 
- bailouts 
- inefficient local taxes 
- poor local tax collection 
- poor national tax collection 
- inefficiencies in the fiscal mix 
- inefficiencies in the provision of local public goods 
 
Those features, in turn, are the outcome of non-cooperative play in the federal fiscal game.  
The non-cooperativeness of fiscal behavior in Argentina could be explained by mapping the 
abstract elements identified in Section 7 into the historical and present characteristics of 
Argentine federal and political institutions. 
 
The environment for intergovernmental transactions has not been the most appropriate; the 
allocation of policy jurisdictions has evolved in a peculiar way throughout the twentieth 
century, while intergovernmental agreements have not been backed up by the institutions 
necessary for overseeing their enforcement.  Intergovernmental competition and conflict 
have prevailed over cooperation in areas of concurrent jurisdiction.  Given Argentina’s 
political and economic instability since the 1930’s (including numerous military 
“interruptions” and high and volatile inflation), political actors have tended to adopt a 
particularly myopic perspective.  National and subnational governments have not invested 
in building intergovernmental institutions, and they have attempted to protect their quite 
vulnerable property rights instead of collaborating with one another. 
 
This historical legacy has deeply affected the revenue-sharing system.  Changes in 
bargaining power of collections of political actors have reflected in shifts in the system of 
transfers.  For instance, when power was concentrated in the national government (mostly 
during military regimes) the changes shifted the distribution of taxes towards retention at 
the national level.  Conversely, with the return to democracy, the once-again elected 
governors managed to get a larger share transferred to the provinces.  These modifications 
in favor of the subnational governments as a whole were, in general, accompanied by an 
element of interprovincial redistribution, depending on coalitional politics at the time 
(Saiegh and Tommasi, 1999). 
 
There have been mutually reinforcing interactions arising from intergovernmental relations 
and the country’s overall incapacity to implement efficient intertemporal exchanges (Spiller 
and Tommasi, 2001).  The combination of lack of legislative incentives, the 
disproportionate power held by provincial leaders in national policymaking, and the ability 
of the national executive to act opportunistically has deeply affected intergovernmental 
relations.  
   24 
Argentina is a case where “executive federalism” (Watts, 1999) is prevalent, that is, the 
president and governors play a predominant role in intergovernmental relations.  Yet, deals 
struck between national and subnational executives can easily be altered at either the 
legislative or the implementation stage.
42  This is compounded by the fact that the 
governors’ influence in national policymaking gives them enough political clout to be able 
to secure occasional legislative benefits at the expense of the national executive or other 
subnational units.  On the other hand, during the implementation stage, the president can 
easily unravel agreements reached or ratified in the national legislature.
43  Thus, these 
agreements are often reached outside the national legislature, and they tend to incorporate 
very rigid rules in order to prevent their modification. 
 
Several features of the Argentine political system explain why the environment is not 
adequate for efficient political transactions among jurisdictions. 
 
Weak national legislators, powerful governors 
 
The national legislature could potentially serve to foster beneficial intercommunity 
agreements.   The U.S. Congress is depicted as an institution where intertemporal political 
agreements are secured.
44  As Weingast and Marshall note, its internal organization and 
institutionalization facilitate the achievement of complex intertemporal agreements among 
its members. Jones et al (2001) show that this is not the case for the Argentine Congress.  
Legislators are short-lived, and they do not have the incentives to develop strong 
congressional institutions. 
 
Jones et al (2001b) trace those incentives to the electoral system, in particular to the 
methods of intra-party candidate selection, and to the incentives they generate for local 
party leaders and for individual politicians.  To return to their seats, legislators first need to 
be put back in the provincially arranged lists.  Most legislators are not put back on the lists, 
due to the incentives of local party leaders (which often coincide with governors), who are 
in charge of drawing the lists.  As Argentina is fairly decentralized on the spending side, 
and as Congress is not a key policymaking arena, oftentimes politicians are happy to be 
moved away from Congress towards more lucrative positions in provincial governments. 
 
As a result of this, Argentine governors have a disproportionate amount of power in 
national politics, and they are continuously involved in national policymaking. The 
frequency with which the Argentine president meets with provincial governors to discuss 
and negotiate national policies may seem particularly odd for an U.S. observer.
45  This 
impinges upon intergovernmental relations, by inducing a peculiar criss-crossing of 
national and “properly federal” issues. 
                                                            
42 As an example relevant for the central issue of the paper, a fiscal rule agreed upon by national and 
subnational executives, might not be implemented because the required subnational legislation is not 
forthcoming. 
43 This is achieved via executive decree powers, ample discretion in the implementation of the budget, etc. 
44 Weingast and Marshall (1988), Cox and McCubbins (1993), Krehbiel (1991). 
45 This fact is particularly evident in the many fiscal pacts signed (1990, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000), in which, 
among other things, provincial governors promised to influence national legislators from their provinces (and 
their party) to vote for this or that law which at the time was important to the national executive.   25 
 
A weak “horizontal” separation of powers   
 
The last point indicates that congressional representatives are not key actors in the 
Argentine polity, neither for intergovernmental relations, nor for anything else, and that 
sub-national leaders exert disproportionate influence through Congress. Under those 
circumstances, one would want to focus on the arenas in which those relevant long-term 
players undertake their interactions.  In turns out that, not only are congressmen not the key 
players, but neither is the National Congress the arena used by the relevant players to 
hammer their agreements, since the weak “horizontal” separation of powers does not 
prevent the national government from reneging on legislative agreements.
46 
 
The weak horizontal separation of powers is due in part to some constitutional capacities 
and practices, to budget practices, to the (historical) political alignment of Supreme Courts 
to the President, and to the lack of a strong, independent and professional bureaucracy.
47  
All of these features contribute to the poor institutional environment for the enforcement of 
interjurisdictional deals. 
 
The “legislative” practices of the presidency have evolved partly out of the history of 
political instability, which has tended to focalize in the Executive processes that, in a more 
stable environment, would have drifted naturally towards the legislature.  They are also 
due, in part, to some explicit constitutional capacities and to some constitutional lacunae 
and their interpretation.   Regarding the budget, during large chunks of Argentine history, 
Congress has not approved the Budget sent by the Executive in time, in practice leaving the 
latter ample discretion. The budget process is conducted mostly in the Cabinet, which is the 
entry point for most pressure-group activity.  It is not uncommon for provincial governors 
to visit the Minister of the Economy, his secretaries, or other ministers, trying to get 
favorable treatment for their provinces in National allocations and decisions.  Furthermore, 
there is a substantial amount of discretion in the ex post geographical allocation of federal 
money.  (See Spiller and Tommasi, 2001, and references therein). 
 
This Executive bias is further aggravated by another institutional factor. Argentina’s 
political instability during the 20
th century undermined the ability of the judiciary to place 
effective restrains on executive action (Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi, 2001).
48 Hence, 
since 1983 there were many instances where the executive made unilateral moves on 
matters previously discussed by Congress without being challenged by the courts (i.e. 
“regulating” and altering the content of bills passed by the legislature through its decree 
authority). 
 
Hence, agreements reached or ratified in a particular way in the national legislature can be 
easily unraveled at the execution stage (i.e., through changes in the composition of the 
                                                            
46  In principle, the national legislature could play a key role in keeping a balance in the intergovernmental 
relations, with the national legislators being the pawns of their masters'  chess game.  
47 See Spiller and Tommasi (2001) for more details and references on each of these points. 
48 Similarly, Bambaci, Spiller and Tommasi (2001) explain the way in which the Argentine bureaucracy 
operates, preventing it from serving as an independent mechanism for enforcing legislative agreements.   26 
national budget). This, of course, limits the incentives to undertake such deals in the first 
place. 
 
Weakly institutionalized intergovernmental relations and its consequences 
 
In the previous subsection, we argued that neither are National legislators the key long-term 
players in intergovernmental relations, nor is the National Congress the arena in which the 
real players (the Governors and the National executive) strike the key bargains.  This begs 
the question of which is, then, the arena for intergovernmental agreements, and which are 
the enforcement properties of that arena.  The truth is that intergovernmental relations in 
Argentina have been carried out in very different ways, mostly on an ad-hoc basis and in 
multiple and superimposed political arenas.  
 
Informal mechanisms have dominated, but formal intergovernmental agreements have also 
been used.  A good example of the latter are the “Federal Fiscal Pacts”: intergovernmental 
compacts hammered out by the national and sub-national government executives and 
ratified by the legislatures of the constituent units (Fiscal Pacts of 1992 and 1993) and the 
national legislature (Fiscal Pacts of 1999 and 2000). Also in 1994, important aspects related 
to fiscal intergovernmental relations were included in Argentina’s revised constitution, 
establishing that a new coparticipation law, on the basis of agreements between the central 
government and the provinces, had to be drafted before 1996. (The law has not been passed 
yet). 
 
However, besides these formal instances of negotiation, intergovernmental relations have 
been predominantly conducted in a much more informal way. For example, in the period 
1983-1988 (in between Coparticipation laws), to decide the allocation of transfers to the 
provinces, each sub-national government negotiated bilateral agreements with the federal 
government (Saiegh and Tommasi 1999).  Since then, many other negotiations and changes 
to the coparticipation scheme took place in the executive quarters, or in ad-hoc meetings of 
the President with Governors. This reflects the separate political power of the national 
executive and the provinces and the lack of institutionalization of the mechanisms to carry 
out these agreements.  
 
This lack of institutionalization in the mechanisms through which intergovernmental 
relations have been handled had serious effects on the nature of policy-making in the 
federal fiscal realm. On the one hand, these arenas did not provide enough institutional 
“stickiness”, making changes in the allocation of policy jurisdictions and in the allocation 
of federal funds too volatile -- and more generally making the enforcement of agreements 
very deficient. On the other hand, in order to avoid such uncertainty and opportunism, 
allocations have at times been defined through very rigid mechanisms, that oftentimes later 
become a straightjacket and the source of further difficulties. 
 
 
10. A comprehensive approach to rules for subnational governments 
 
In this section we illustrate, with the Argentine case, the broader approach that we suggest 
towards institutional reforms to improve fiscal performance of subnational (and national!)   27 
governments. It is important to notice that, even though we are convinced about the 
usefulness of our overall approach, its detailed implementation is a complex matter, and 
many of the details of what we suggest might be improved upon. 
 
One of the things to stress is that the recipes for addressing federal fiscal problems are 
likely to be country specific and even context specific within a given country.  The 
historical and recent evolution of underlying political exchanges have to be taken seriously 
into consideration, since they are the foundations from which reforms must build upon. In 
the Argentine case, there have been successive rounds of fiscal pacts in 1992, 1993, the 
1994 Constitution, 1999, and 2000, as well as continuous negotiations and modifications 
in-between pacts.  These pacts have attempted to address the underlying problems, the main 
concerns of the times, as well as the worries of the different parties against the opportunism 
of others.  The main problem has been the inability to enforce those pacts.
49  One of the 
most salient failures has been the repeated attempts to replace the very inefficient 
provincial turnover sales tax.  Replacing it would have required actions that would have left 
the complying province vulnerable to future opportunism by the national government and 
by non-complying provinces.  The institutional structure of fiscal federalism in Argentina 
was unable to enforce that efficiency-enhancing intertemporal agreement. 
 
There is almost absolute consensus among observers and political actors that Argentina 
should undertake various reforms to its federal fiscal system.  Major lending organizations 
and other specialists have produced many reform proposals seeking to correct several of the 
deficiencies we have described.  Some of these proposals even include fiscal rules narrowly 
defined.  However, these “recipes for change” are not followed.  As we argued, even if 
there are efficiency gains, transactional problems (specially the enforceability of those 
transactions) make the reforms difficult to enact. 
 
We believe, therefore, that a feasible and sustainable reform strategy must focus at a higher 
level of institutional reform. It is necessary to reform the structure and process of 
intergovernmental decision-making.  In the spirit of Figure 1, we should find a way of 
moving upward rather than side-ways on the diagram.  Present-day conventional wisdom 
among economists is to argue in favor of rules – i.e., moving from political opportunism to 
rigid rules, taking as given the underlying political incentives.  We argue instead in favor of 
changing the political governance structure, if possible.   
 
In the specific case of Argentina, there are several features that lead to a bad transactions 
environment for fiscal federalism.  According to our approach (see also Spiller and 
Tommasi 2001), public policies are the outcome of a game that has as rules the overall set 
of incentives and constraints faced by political actors, in multiple arenas.  Hence, in order 
to improve macro-fiscal outcomes, the workings of fiscal federalism, as well as the general 
process of policy-making in Argentina, reforms are necessary in several fronts.   
 
                                                            
49 It is worth noting that sometimes the pacts included some forms of fiscal rules.  Also it is worth noting that 
gradually the pacts have been incorporating broader elements, such as attempting to delineate the components 
that the future Tax-Sharing Agreement should have, incorporating procedural restrictions on the national 
budget, etc.   28 
Having diagnosed the determinants of poor subnational fiscal behavior: 
- large vertical fiscal imbalances 
- a tax-sharing regime with little incentives to raise taxes locally 
- several bail-out channels 
- several political motives why the federal government might be willing to bail out 
provinces 
- lack of enforcement of intergovernmental agreements, 
 
we suggest a general strategy, which should include:
50 
 
1. reforms to the electoral mechanisms to lower the dependency of national legislators on 
local party elites (as the analysis of the previous section suggests, the weakness of 
national legislators is one key aspect of the poor transactions environment) 
2. reforms to the instruments of legislative interaction between the President and Congress 
(this could improve the possibility of enforcing, and hence of achieving in the first 
place, more efficient agreements) 
3. reforms to the budget process to curtail some Executive discretion (as it seems to have 
been instrumented in the Mexican case), limiting the ability to perform bailouts. 
4. institutional reforms to intergovernmental relations (given that these federal 
transactions will inevitably involve “executive federalism” among the national 
government and provincial authorities, we want to improve the institutional 
environment for those transactions). 
5. reforms to the tax-sharing agreement to improve the Wicksellian connection between 
the taxes raised and the public goods consumed within each jurisdiction 
6. macro – fiscal rules to guide through this transition towards a more cooperative (and 
more sustainable) fiscal stance.
51 
 
Looking into the political feasibility of reforms:  (1) is very hard, so we can discard it for 
now; 
52 there was window of opportunity for (2) at the beginning of the De la Rua 
government in 1999, but (as many other things) it was lost.  Reforms 3 to 6 present a 
compact package, all of which could be undertaken under the roof of the still unfulfilled 
1994 constitutional mandate. 
 
The Constitution amended in 1994, calls for a new Coparticipation Law  (article 75, 2
nd 
paragraph).  It explicitly includes several aspects that the new law should take into 
consideration.   Those conditions can be understood in light of the argument developed in 
this paper, as constraints that the actors try to impose on each other to prevent from 
                                                            
50 See Tommasi and Spiller (2000) and Iaryczower, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000).  As stated before, 
several of the details of the proposal are subject to improvement, and these things need periodic readjustment 
in light of ongoing political moments. 
51 Those rules include a moving average mechanism to smooth out and to make more foreseable the flow of 
tax revenue received by the provinces. (See González, Rosenblatt and Webb, 2002). 
52 Although the terrible crisis that Argentina is living today (early 2002) might open the door for more 
ambitious political reforms.  Unfortunately, it is not obvious at this point that the window of opportunity will 
lead to reforms in the right direction.   29 
opportunism, at the same time that they attempt to enforce some efficient reforms.
53  In 
particular, the Constitution mandates the creation of a Federal Fiscal Institution (“Órgano 
Fiscal Federal”) to instrument that law.   
 
Given the problems we have emphasized in the previous section, we believe that this 
mandate provides a good opportunity to redefine the governance structure of federal fiscal 
relations. This constitutionally mandated Federal Fiscal Institution could function as a 
formal arena in which issues of fiscal federalism would be decided.   Such institution, thus, 
can provide intergovernmental relations with the necessary flexibility to adjust to changing 
circumstances. A Federal Fiscal Law is an incomplete contract reflecting the political 
agreement at the time of its creation.  If the Law were to specify a set of mechanisms to 
distribute taxes (i.e., a “rule”) it will still always require adjustments to many changing 
circumstances, as the history of fiscal federalism in Argentina shows (Saiegh and Tommasi 
2000b).   If no explicit change is made to the federal governance structure, the contract will 
be “completed” under the “default” extant governance structure.  But we have argued that 
the features of the extant governance structure described above, are precisely the 
underlying determinants of the many economic inefficiencies observed today.  That is why 
this higher-level institutional change is required, so as to “complete” the contract with 
better ex-post decision procedures.
54  
 
The purpose of the Federal Fiscal Institution, hence, should be to provide the proper 
channel for intergovernmental dealings, away from the national legislature, from informal 
and unenforceable executive-executive deals, and especially from some excessive ex-post 
discretion in the hands of the National Executive.
55  This will help to minimize the 
crisscrossing patterns between national and regional policies described above, and will also 
help the actors to make decisions in a foreseeable setting.  This should allow them to handle 




We think that changes in the federal decision making procedure, coupled with changes in 
the transfer system that substantially increase the Wicksellian connection will constitute a 
profound redefinition of fiscal federalism in Argentina. Provinces will assume greater 
individual responsibilities, and will acquire more collective power in federal decisions.  It is 
                                                            
53 The Constitution requires that the new law be a “ley Convenio”, i.e., a law that has to be agreed by the 
national and all provincial executives, and then ratified by the national and provincial legislators.  This is a 
way of insuring “unanimity”, so that no one is harmed by the reform. Even though this represents an obstacle 
at first, it is important for the stability and credibility of the norms, as stressed by Kopits (2001) in his 
discussion of the statutory level of fiscal rules (see also Drazen 2002). 
54 See Saiegh and Tommasi (2000) for more detailed references to the incomplete contracts literature 
supporting this reasoning. 
55 It also attempts to move from the bilateral hub-spoke relationships that the federal government currently has 
with individual provinces towards more open multilateral arenas, as has been attempted in the Spanish case 
(Onrubia and Revenga, 2002). 
56 The details of the structure proposed for this Organo Fiscal Federal are in Iaryczower, Sanguinetti and 
Tommasi (2000).  It includes an independent technical agency (along the lines suggested in Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and von Hagen, 1998), a definition of voting rights and voting rules among jursidictions, as well as 
the procedures for the interactions between the technical agency and the political body.   30 
only in the context of this broader reform scheme, that it makes sense to discuss the (very 





We started working on this paper with the idea of identifying the circumstances in which 
fiscal rules might be called for, and of looking into the details of the design of fiscal rules.  
Yet, our initial approach to the theoretical foundations of fiscal rules, as well as the 
observation of some past Latin American experiences, led us to a more skeptical view,  
which called for some broader analysis before getting into the practical details of rules.  
The paper has attempted to provide that first step. 
 
We argue that observed properties of policies are the outcome of a political game in which 
relevant actors make decisions at each point in time and engage in intertemporal exchanges.  
The quality of the resulting policies for social welfare will depend on the extent to which 
the rules of the political game facilitate cooperative (efficient) exchanges. 
 
In order to improve fiscal performance in a sustainable and efficient manner, one needs to 
focus on the determinants of fiscal behavior.  In each country, the main deficiencies need to 
be identified, together with a complete diagnostic of their fiscal and political determinants.  
On the basis of such diagnostic, one should attempt to design interventions at the deepest 
level possible.  In that context, fiscal rules can be a useful instrument to accompany that 
transition path.
57  On the other hand, an excessive focus on rules might lead to a risky sense 






                                                            
57 Recent Latin American episodes, like the Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000, and the Mexican 
attempt to limit bailout capabilities of the central government, might indeed constitute such broader moves; 
but more detailed analysis of the evolution of those agreements, of the prior history, and of several contextual 
variables will be necessary before a definitive judgement can be passed.   31 
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Table 2: Some evidence on Fiscal Rules in Latin America 
Country  Colombia  Mexico  Brazil  Argentina 
Year   1 997    1 998  1 999 
Kind of 
restriction 
Borrowing Constraint – Traffic Light 
Law 
  Ex-ante control over subnational debt  Fiscal Responsibility Law 
Level of 
government  
Subnational Governments    Subnational Governments  National Government, and later 
subnational governments. 
Tested  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Main 
Characteristics 
Demand side restriction on borrowing 
and supply side regulation (fully 
provisioned for red light territories) 
  Senate approval is required for all 
subnational govt borrowing 
operations, prohibiting the issue of 
bonds and borrowing from state-
owned banks 
- Deficit Target and Fiscal Balance 
convergence path.  
- Pluriannual Budget formulation. 
- Limits on Current expenditure 
growth. 
- Transparency  
Non-compliance 
event 
According to MoF out of 21 depts. 
That required permission for new 
credit, 10 approximately got new credit 
without permission  
  The states observed the prohibitions 
on new bond issues only in the narrow 
legal sense: they did not halt the 
capitalization of interest on existing 
bond debt. Nor did these regulations 
stop new “emergency lending” by 
Central govt  intermediaries. 
National govt: No year since 1999 the 
Deficit Targets were fulfilled.  
 
Subnational: 6 out of 11 did not 
comply with deficit limits. 3 out of 8 
did not comply with spending limits. 
Enforcement  J udicial    J udicial  J udicial 
Year   2000  2000  2000   
Kind of 
restriction 
Fiscal Responsibility Law  Market discipline for subnational 
borrowing 
Fiscal Responsibility Law   
Levels of 
governments  
All Subnational Governments  Subnational Governments  All levels of government   
Tested  No  No  No   
Main Features 
Limits and restriction on: 
- Current Expenditure 
- Municipality creation 
- Transparency. 
 
- No discretional transfers to states. 
- No securing debt with payments 
from the revenue sharing agreement. 
- Subnational debt subjected to normal 
credit exposure celings. 
- Bank´s capital risk weigthing linked 
to the international rating of the SNG. 
 
It applies to the three levels of 
government and encompasses all 
branches. This Law contains explicit 
numerical hard budget and intra-
budget constraints, public 
dissemination of information, and 
institutional and individual sanctions. 
The law goes into full effect in 2002. 
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Table 4: Main Characteristics of Subnational Fiscal Rules in Argentina 
Explicit Limits on 











GCBA  NO               
Buenos 
Aires 
NO               
Catamarca  YES  12/00 Yes          Yes 
Cordoba  YES  03/00 Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   
Corrientes  NO               
Chaco  YES  05/00 Yes  Yes    Yes     
Chubut  YES   -  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Entre Rios NO               
Formosa  YES  12/99 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
J ujuy  NO               
La Pampa  NO               
La Rioja  NO               
Mendoza  YES  01/00 Yes        Yes   
Misiones  YES  05/00 Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Neuquen  YES  -   Yes    Yes       
Río Negro  YES  01/01 Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Salta  YES  05/99 Yes  Yes  Yes       
San Juan  YES  01/01 Yes  Yes  Yes       
San Luis  YES  08/99   Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Santa Cruz NO               
Santa Fe  NO               
Santiago 
Del Estero 
NO               
Tucuman  YES  09/99 Yes    Yes  Yes     
Tierra del 
Fuego 
YES  08/00 Yes  Yes         
National 
Govt.  
YES  09/99 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 5:  
Degree of accomplishment of Provincial  Solvency and Fiscal Responsibility Laws 
Deficit and Expenditure goals 


























Explicit Limit on 


























For year 2000: 2% of the 
average of total 
expenditure of years 






















The Current Expenditure 
cannot grow more than  
Regional Domestic 
Product (RDP). If RDP 
decrease, the Current 














  For year 2000: the deficit 
must be less than 100 
millions. Them it must 













For year 2000: the 
primary surplus must be 
equal to the 50% of 
public debt interest of 
that year. 
The surplus was 
70% of public debt 





The Current Expenditure 
cannot grow more than 
RDP. If RDP decrease, 
the Current Expenditure 
must be held constant. 



















For Year 2000: the 
deficit must be less than 
the debt amortization of 
this year. 
99 millions of 
budgetary deficit 







The Primary Expenditure 
cannot grow more than 
National Resources. If 
National Resources 
decrease, the Primary 
















  No explicit, Fiscal 















For Year 2000: the 
deficit must be less than 
the debt amortization of 
this year. 
134 millions of 
budgetary deficit 






The Primary Expenditure 
cannot grow more than 
National Resources. If 
National Resources 
decrease, the Primary 
















  Primary surplus must be 
3% of total revenue at 
year 2001 
At the first 
semester of 20001 
the primary surplus 





The Current expenditure 
must be lower than 833 
millions in year 2000. 
The Current 
Expenditure were 















For 2001, the primary 
result must be zero 
At the first 
semester of 2001 
the primary deficit 










  Fiscal equilibrium  The fiscal deficit 
was 69 millions (7% 





must be lower than 65% 
of Current Revenue. 
The personnel 
Expenditure were 















  Fiscal equilibrium  At the first 
semester of 2001 
the primary deficit 





must be lower than 65% 
of Current Revenue. 
The Personnel 
Expenditure were 



















The Current Expenditure 
grow must be lower than 
the Current revenue 
growth. If Current 
revenue decreases, the 
Current Expenditure must 
be held constant. 
The Current 
Expenditure 





















  The fiscal deficit must be 
equal to the budgeted. 
9 millions of 






No     
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Table 6: Compliance of Constitutional Debt-Service Rule (Argentine provinces) 
 
J urisdiction  Constitutional 
limits 
Debt service / 
Total Revenue 
Year 2000 
G.C.B.A.  No limit  3% 
Buenos Aires  No limit  3% 
Catamarca (a)  20%  24% 
Córdoba (b)  20%  13% 
Corrientes   25%  41 % 
Chaco  25%  14% 
Chubut  No limit  12% 
Entre Ríos  25%  27% 
Formosa  25%  39% 
J ujuy  20%  31 % 
La Pampa  25%  1% 
La Rioja  (b)   25%  6% 
Mendoza  No limit  14% 
Misiones   25%  10% 
Neuquén   No limit  14% 
Río Negro  25%  26% 
Salta   25%  13% 
San Juan   No limit  12% 
San Luis  (b)  25%  0% 
Santa Cruz   No limit  2% 
Santa Fe   25%  5% 
Sgo del Estero  25%  6% 
Tucumán  No limit  22% 
Tierra del Fuego   25%  19% 
 
Source: own elaboration based in Sanguinetti (2001) and Ministry of Economy 
 
(a) It should not be higher that 20% of five-year average 
(b) Based on the lowest revenue within the past three years 
   41 
 
Figure 1 
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